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PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
IN THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
NOBUSHIGE U1KAI* and NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON**
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JAPANESE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES

AND AMERICAN

A. The Issue
Some writers find a reflection of the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution in
Article 31 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution. Article 31 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other
criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established
by law." Obviously there are disparities as well as similarities between
this article and the American due process clauses.' Since the Japanese
Constitution was framed under the direction of the Supreme Com-

mand Allied Powers (SCAP), during the allied occupation, the similarities are not surprising. In the words of an Indian Supreme Court
judge: 2
One of the characteristics of the [Japanese] Constitution which undoubtedly bespeaks of direct American influence is to be found in a lengthy
chapter, consisting of 31 articles, entitled, "Rights and Duties of the
People," which provided for the first time an effective "Bill - Rights"
for the Japanese people.
Many of those articles reflect other provisions of the American Bill of
Rights. Consequently, the natural surmise is that Article 31 of the
* Professor of Law, Seikei University (Tokyo).

**Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Visiting Professor of Law, 1968-69,
University of Washington. The substance of this article is due entirely to the scholarship and thought of Professor Ukai. My function has been principally to act as a
"go-between" for Professor Ukai and the Law Review editors who have been extremely helpful.-N.L.N.
'U.S. CowsT. amend. V: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due prdcess of law; ... " U.S. CoxsT. amend XIV, § 1: "No state shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; ..."

The English translation of all of the Japanese constitutional articles cited in

this paper are taken from THE

CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES

(Supreme Court of Japan, 1958). This translation is not official, ie., the Japanese
text is the only official version of the Constitution. This fact should be kept in
mind when comparatively analyzing the United States and Japanese constitutions
since the translation may or may not accurately represent the official Japanese text.
'Judge Fazl Ali in Gopalan v. State of Madras, 37 All India Rptr. 27, 57 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
[1129]
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Japanese Constitution is derived from the due process clauses of the
United States Constitution.
Nevertheless, even if one clause is derived from the other, there are
reasons for questioning whether their meanings are therefore substantially the same. The differences in wording are significant. But more
important is the divergent historical development of the two provisions.
B. HistoricalDevelopment of Due Processin the United States
The interpretation of due process in American constitutional history may be divided into four stages. During the first period, before
the American Civil War, it was limited almost entirely to matters of
procedure. As Mr. Justice Story said in his Commentaries, the fifth
amendment "in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process
and proceedings of the common law."'
The second period of interpretation began after the Civil War and
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. During this period a
broader view of the due process clause was urged. Thus when a law
conferring a monopoly on the slaughtering of livestock was challenged
as violative of due process, this view was supported by at least two of
the dissenting justices.' Gradually this "substantive" view of the due
process clause gained additional support, and in 1897 the Court unanimously held that it was a violation of due process for a state to
forbid its residents from making contracts with out-of-state insurance
companies.' More important than the Court's decision was its reasoning, which embraced this statement: 6
The liberty mentioned in that amendment [the fourteenth] means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
'J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1783

(1833), quoted by B. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 23 (1965).
'Comnpare The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1872), dissenting opinion of Justice Bradley, with the concurring opinion of Justice Bradley
in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 760 (1883).
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Id. at 589.
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The third stage covers the period in which this broad view of the
substantive reach of the due process clause dominated the scene and
resulted in the invalidation of many laws, such as those establishing
maximum working hours, minimum wages, and various forms of price
control and licensing.7
The fourth period began in the early days of the New Deal and
extends to the present. During this period the use of due process as a
substantive restriction upon the regulation of the economy has been
largely suspended or abandoned."
It seems quite likely that the lawyers on General MacArthur's staff
who drafted the Japanese Constitution were strongly influenced by the
legal developments of the New Deal and were in favor of the due
process interpretation of the fourth period. Furthermore, some Japanese scholars assert that Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution
should be interpreted as limited to procedural due process not only as a
direct inference from the American experience, but also on the basis of
Japanese social and economic development.
C. The Significance of Differing Phraseology
The deletion of "property" and the substitution of "procedure established by law" for "due process of law" characterize the Japanese
Constitution when compared with that of the United States. This
change is also seen in the Indian Constitution." -Both were patterned
more or less closely on the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution. Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution mentions only
"life and liberty," whereas the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution use the phrase "life, liberty and property."
Article 21 of the 1948 Indian Constitution, closely resembling the
Japanese clause, provides: "No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
Apparently the judges of the Indian Supreme Court attach considerable significance to the similarity in expression of the Indian and Japanese provisions and their common departure from the American. For
'The outstanding examples were Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
'C.

SWISHER, THE GROWTH

107 (1946).

OF CONSTITUTIONAL

POWER IN

THE UNITED

STATES

1T. MIYASAWA, KEziP5 (Constitution) 400, in H6RITSUGAKU ZENSHfY (1959);
H. Tanaka, Kempj 31 j6 (iwayurtc tekilha tetsuzuki j]ka ni tsuite (On Article 31 (the
so-called due process clause)), in 8 NIHONKOKU KEI P6 TAIKEi 165-200 (1965).
10Durga Das Basu, Limitations of Fundamental Rights-with Special Reference
to the Constitutions of U.S.A., India and Japan, KEmP6 CH6SAKAI 92 (1959).
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in 1950 the Supreme Court of India sustained the validity of the Preventive Detention Act partly on the ground that "the Constituent
Assembly had before it the American article and the expression due
process of law but they deliberately dropped the use of that expression
from our Constitution."'"
1. Significance of the Omission of "Property."-Let us consider more
fully the significance of this difference in phraseology so far as Japanese constitutional law is concerned. Considering first the omission of
the word "property," it should be noted that the rights of property are
explicitly protected by other provisions of the Japanese Constitution.
Article 29 in particular contains three important stipulations: 12
1. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable.
2. Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with public
welfare.
3. Private property may be taken for public tise upon just compensation
therefor.
It is natural to surmise that the word "property" was omitted from
Article 31 because property rights are explicitly protected in Article
29. Indeed, substantially the same guarantees and qualifications of
property rights now included in Article 29 were originally set forth in
three separate articles of what is frequently referred to as the MacArthur draft of the Constitution. Thus the guarantees of property
rights and personal liberties which were treated together in the fifth
amendment of the American Constitution were deliberately placed in
separate articles in the Japanese Constitution. It must be remembered, however, that the line between property and personal rights is
not always distinct. Thus the provision of Article 22 which guarantees
to every person the right "to choose his occupation to the extent that it
does not interfere with the public welfare" and the provision of Article
28 which states that " [t] he right of workers to organize and to bargain
and act collectively is guaranteed" may be thought of in part as protection of one's property interest in his own labor.
It is also noteworthy that the Japanese Constitution states in Article
13 that the "[r]ight to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall,
to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the
supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs."
This article may be regarded as a legacy from Thomas Jefferson who
" Gopalan v. State of Madras, 37 All India Rptr. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
'2JAPANESE CONST.

art. 29.
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gave John Locke's phrase "life, liberty and property" a more humanistic flavor by substituting "pursuit of happiness" for "property,"
when he transplanted it into the Declaration of Independence.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the omission of the word
"property" from Article 31 was not intended to deprive property
interests of a substantial measure of constitutional protection. It is
perhaps more open to debate whether such protection is to be achieved
through Article 31 itself, or only through other provisions of the Constitution.
2. Significance of "Procedure Established by Law."-There is historical support for the view that the substitution of "procedure established by law" for the American phrase "due process of law" is not of
great significance. Coke in his Institutes asserted that the phrase
"law of the land" used in the Magna Carta is equivalent to "due process of law."' The Indian Supreme Court, on the other hand, took the
view that the deliberate omission of the word "due" from Article 21
of the Indian Constitution lent strength to the contention that the
reasonableness of a law was not a justiciable question under the Indian
Constitution.14 It is also of some interest that the original draft of the
Japanese Constitution submitted to the Japanese Government by
SCAP used the phrase "procedure established by the Diet" instead of
"procedure established by law." Later the Japanese Constituent Assembly substituted the word "law" for "Diet," but since there is no
record left, we do not know why this change was made.' 5

II. Tn MEANING OF ARTICLE 31
A. The Issue
Broadly speaking, there are three issues which are decisive in the
interpretation of Article 31:
(1) Is it limited to procedural due process, or does it include substantive questions as well?
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 24.
"Chief Justice Kania in Gopalan v. State of Madras, 37 All India Rptr. 27, 39
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
"It should be noted that the official Japanese text reads in part, "huritsu no
sadameru tetsuzuki" ("procedure established by statute"). That is, the official text
does not use "hW (equivalent to "law"), but instead uses "haritsu" ("statute"). It is
apparent from other contexts of the Constitution that "h6ritsu," as used in the Constitution, means the acts (statutes) of the Diet.
The Assembly made another change in the SCAP draft which originally stated:
"No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any criminal penalty be
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(2) Is it limited to criminal sanctions or can it be extended to
administrative sanctions as well?
(3) Does it control the content of the law or can it be satisfied
so long as the forms of law are provided, irrespective of their
fairness or reasonableness? 16
The narrowest interpretation views Article 31 as limited to the
guarantee of criminal procedures stipulated in laws passed by the
Diet; the broadest interpretation views it as including administrative
as well as criminal sanctions, applying to substantive as well as procedural matters, and requiring not only that there be a law, but also
that the law be just.
In Japan, scholars have a variety of views ranging from the narrowest to the broadest.' Some believe that Article 31 means that substantive as well as procedural requirements must be established by
law, but that only the procedural requirements must conform to
natural justice or due process. Others believe that both procedural
and substantive matters must be stipulated by law, but in neither case
are the courts to adjudicate the validity of their content, except insofar
as they may contravene some other more specific provision of the Constitution.
When it was discussed in the Constituent Assembly, Mr. Kimura,
then Minister of Justice, in the course of answering questions from
the members, said that Article 31 controlled not only criminal but also
administrative matters and not only procedural but also substantive
stipulations."8 This statement was an expression of opinion by the
imposed...." During subsequent discussions, the word "other" was inserted, changing the phrase to "any other criminal penalty." It might be deduced from this
modification that the protection against deprivation of life and liberty is confined to
criminal proceedings and may not be extended to administrative limitations. The
significance of this change depends upon the importance given the exact wording
of the Constitution and the original intent of those who framed and approved it.
16For an American reader, the terms procedural and substantive due process have
a connotation somewhat different from that presented in the three issues. The "substantive questions" in issue (1) involve questions of the justness of the laws and are
largely synonomous with the "content of the law" in issue (3). The first issue differentiates between this sense of "substantive" due process and "procedural" (e.g., adequate notice, unbiased judge, etc.) as seen from the individual's viewpoint. The third
issue is framed from the legislative viewpoint and contrasts an investigation of the
just content of the law with the more limited question of whether the law is duly
enacted.
See, e.g., T. MINOBE, NIHONKOKU KE-IP6 GENRON (Principles of the Constitution of Japan) 177 et. seq. (1952). Government representatives took the position that
Article 31 is limited to procedural requirements. OKADA, NIHONKOKU KE.NIP6 SHINGI
YORON (Excerpts of the minutes of the constitutional Diet) 341 (1947).
IS 2
CHIKUJ6 NIHONKOKU KEP6 SHINGIROKU (The minutes of the Japanese constitutional Diet) 725 (S. Shimizu ed. 1962).
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presiding government official suggesting that the scope of Article 31
was broader than its exact wording.
This background indicates the vagueness of legislative intention
existing on the part of the Constitution makers. It is not too clear
whether they had in mind the American due process stipulation, let
alone the historical development of its interpretation. Professor Hideo
Tanaka has stated that the members of the SCAP staff intended to
avoid the broad interpretation of the due process clause, taking a
lesson from the American experience of the turn of the century.19
Be that as it may, the situation in Japan is somewhat different from
that in the United States. Japan still requires stronger guarantees than
the West, lest the lack of the historical background for freedom should
prove a fatal defect in the whole constitutional structure of its society.
Therefore the broadest interpretation of Article 31 should be favored,
including the implications of due process. At the same time, certain
inherent limitations on the exercise of judicial power should be recognized, such as the requirement of justiciability and the avoidance of
purely political questions.
B. JudicialInterpretation
The first few cases which involved Article 31 were concerned with
problems of delegated legislative authority. These cases dealt with
the imposition of criminal penalties, including (a) Cabinet and Ministry orders, (b) rules of the National Personnel Agency pertaining to
the civil service, and (c) local by-laws or ordinances. Although the
particular type of delegation is different in each of these situations, the
general principle is the same-so long as the authority to issue the
regulations is explicitly delegated by the legislation, and the regulations issued are within the limits of the delegation, they are valid.
The first case of this type concerned a delegation under the Food
Control Law." The law itself explicitly provided for delegation of
controls over the distribution of food through cabinet order. The
Cabinet order in turn delegated control over the transportation of
staple foods to the Minister of Agriculture, to be enforced by such
penalties as were stipulated in the law. The petitioner claimed that the
delegation of authority to include penalty provisions in cabinet orders
"D
H. Tanaka,

supranote 9, at 186.
'Shokurya kanrih5 (Food control law) (Law No. 40, 1942). The case is Japan
v. Sugioka, 5 Saik6 saibansho keiii hanreishri [hereinafter cited Keishia] 2463 (Sup.,
Ct., G.B., Dec. 5, 1951).
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was explicitly provided for in Article 73(6), as an exception to Article
31, and was therefore to be strictly limited to that form of order;
consequently the cabinet order could not delegate to a lower form of
order the definition of acts to be punished under the law. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the law implied
authority to sub-delegate by cabinet order to other forms of order.
The only limitation was that the framework within which lower orders
could control must be stipulated by the cabinet order. Penalties stipulated by the law were not affected.
The second case arose under the National Civil Service Law.2 The
statute provided that political actions of civil servants should be restricted in accordance with regulations issued by the National Personnel Agency, violations of such regulations to be punishable in accordance with provisions of the statute. Personnel Agency Rule 14-7
defined the meaning of "political acts" and "political purposes" as
used in the statute. It said, inter alia, that political purposes include
support of or opposition to a particular candidate in an election for
public office, and that political action includes utilization of the title
or authority of public office and other public or private influence.
The penalty for violation was that stipulated in the statute. The Supreme Court, after analyzing the rule, held that it was not substantively unconstitutional and did not transgress the limits set forth in
the statute. Consequently, there was no occasion for the application
of Article 31 of the Constitution.
The third case concerned the validity of a city ordinance prohibiting
various forms of vice. 2 The Supreme Court, relying on precedent,
stated that the delegation of the power to prescribe penalties through
local by-laws was not contrary to Article 31, and therefore not unconstitutional. The penalty for violation of the ordinance or by-law was
provided for by the statute2 3 which established a maximum of two
years' imprisonment and 100,000 yen fine. But the exact delegation
was different here than in the previous cases because the statute established only the limits of the penalty, permitting each by-law to
stipulate the exact penalty for its violation within those limits.
In general the above cases discussed the propriety of defining criminal conduct through forms of law other than a statute passed by the
2'Kokka k,3muinh (National civil service law) (Law No. 120, 1947). The case is
Japan v. Onakano, 12 Keishfi 1272 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 1958).
=Japan v. Kurokami, 13 Keishfi 450 (Sup. Ct., April 23, 1959).
Chih5 jichih5 (Local government law) art. 14(5) (Law No. 67, 1947).
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Diet; this problem can be solved by application of the general theory
of delegated legislative authority.
Now we turn to cases presenting the question whether the content
of a law complies with the principle of Article 31.
1. Lower Court Cases.-Therehave been a few lower court decisions
which struck down statutes because, while following the form of law,
the statutes were thought to be in conflict with the fundamental idea
of due process implied in Article 31. One example is a decision of the
Osaka District Court, rendered in 1962, holding invalid a provision of
24
a law controlling possession of guns, swords and similar weapons.
The provision in question made it a crime not to report the acquisition
of guns immediately. This provision was declared invalid because the
word "immediately" was considered too indefinite and vague.
Another decision of the Osaka District Court held invalid a provision of the Local Government Employees Law which prohibited completely, on pain of criminal punishment, all strikes by local government employees. 5 The Court concluded that the law violated Article
18 (involuntary servitude) and Article 28 (the right to organize and
bargain collectively) because it prohibited all strikes, absolutely and
indiscriminately. Moreover, because there was no reasonable or substantial ground for prescribing punishment in all such cases, it also
violated Article 31.
Similarly, in the well-known "Sunakawa Case" involving the United
States-Japan Security Treaty, the Tokyo District Court declared invalid as a violation of Article 31 of the Constitution a special penal
law based on the executive agreement between the United States and
Japan, because it imposed substantially heavier punishment than that
imposed by the general Misdemeanor Law for similar offenses. 6 The
court reasoned that there was no justifiable ground for such a distinction if the stationing of American forces in Japan was in violation
of Article 9 of the Constitution, as the court found.
Finally, the action of the warden of a prison prohibiting a convicted
prisoner awaiting the death penalty from subscribing to a newspaper
' Japan v. Kiriyama, 4 Kaky-a saibansho keiji sanbanreishfa [hereinafter cited
Kakyai keishfi] 684 (Osaka Dist. Ct., July 14, 1962), rev'd, 15 K6t6 saibansho keiji

hanreishC 649 (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 10, 1962). However, with these cases in mind,
the stipulation of the law was later revised to read "within 20 days," instead of
"immediately."
'Japan v. Katayama, 6 Kakyfi keishii 309 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Mar. 30, 1964).

'Japan v. Sakata, 1 Kakyii keishii 776 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 30, 1959). A translation of the Supreme Court decision which reversed this case is contained in J. MAKI,
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN

298-361 (1964).
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was declared invalid by the Osaka District Court to be a violation of
the spirit of Article 31 of the Constitution."
Although these cases show a strong appreciation on the part of some
lower courts of the importance of safeguarding the, fundamental rights
of the people, it is obvious that this "due process" theory of Article 31
will not be a panacea for all the mistakes of government. This is
particularly evident since the higher courts did not sustain the decisions of the district courts just mentioned. Thus the question whether
the theory of "due process" has been imported into the Japanese Constitution must be confronted.
2. Supreme Court Cases.-This question was considered by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered in November of 1962.2 The Court
held unconstitutional and void a statutory provision for the forfeiture
of property used in smuggling but allegedly owned by an innocent third
party. The defendants had conspired to export goods illegally to
Korea; without permission from the customs authority they loaded a
ship with cargo and weighed anchor, but a storm turned them back
into port, resulting in the failure of their plan. The courts of first and
second instance, following earlier precedents of the Supreme Court,
did not discuss the validity of Article 83(1) of the Customs Law
(Kanzeihd). The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision
and held the statutory provision invalid. 9 The statute did except from
forfeiture goods owned by innocent third parties; however, it did not
provide any method of notice to them or opportunity for them to
present their defenses.
The Supreme Court stated that forfeiture of the property of an
innocent third party was extremely unreasonable if no opportunity for
2 Son v. Warden of Osaka Prison, 9 Gy6sei jiken saibanreishri 1662 (Osaka Dist.
Ct., Aug. 20, 1958).
' Japan v. Kunihiro, 16 Keishfi 1577 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
After the decision of the Supreme Court nullifying Article 118 of the Customs
Law as applied to property owned by third parties, the statute was supplemented by
the Emergency Measure on Confiscation Procedure (Law No. 138, July 12, 1963).
This law provides that in the case of forfeiture of property owned by those other
than the defendants, the third parties are to be notified by the public prosecutor of all
the particulars of the case and of their right to participate in defense of their interests. If it is impossible to give personal notice because the whereabouts of the
third party is unknown or for some other reason, an appropriate public notice is to
be published in the public gazette and newspapers and also on the bulletin board of
the prosecutor's office. The statute also provides the procedure for participation in
the proceedings by the third parties.
'The Customs Law was amended in 1954 (Law No. 61); however, since the case
arose prior to 1954, article 83(1) of the old law was at issue.
In the first of the smuggling cases, 14 Keishi 1574 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 19, 1960),
the Court denied an appeal based on violation of the rights of third parties. How-
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notice and presentation of his defenses was afforded him. The Court
concluded: 0 "Since there is no stipulation in Article 83(1) or in the
Articles of Criminal Procedure about these matters, it is contrary to
Articles 31 and 29 of the Constitution to confiscate property owned by
a third party."'"
The position taken by the Supreme Court in this case seems to be a
long step toward the Western idea of procedural due process. Indeed
the principle that fair procedure is required by natural justice seems
to be clearly accepted by the Japanese Supreme Court.
This decision also seems to mean that the former minority has now
become the majority in giving a broader interpretation to Article 31.
32
As Mr. Justice Harlan said in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.
Perhaps the fact that the opinion of the Japanese Supreme Court is
changing shows a similar trend in the development of Japanese law.
ever, seven justices dissented. During 1960, three justices from the majority and
two from the minority retired. In the 1962 case, four of the new appointees joined
the previous minority, while one joined the previous majority. Thus, the previous
minority became the majority. On the particular point concerning the right of the
accused to urge the rights of third parties, the majority in the 1962 case stated:
Therefore, it is natural that the accused, against whom the forfeiture was
ordered, should be allowed to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that
the decision of forfeiture is unconstitutional, even in the case of property
owned by a third party, since it is an additional penalty imposed on the accused.
Moreover, such a remedy is all the more appropriate because it is clear that
the accused's rights are affected insofar as he is deprived of possession of the
property, put in the position of not being able to use it or profit from it, and
above all, subjected to the danger of a demand from the third party whose
property is being forfeited. It is therefore appropriate to overrule the decision
rendered by the Grand Bench of this Court on October 19, 1960, which is in
conflict with the present decision.
16 Keishfi 1577, 1581 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
Japan v. Kunihiro, 16 Keishii 1577, 1580 (Sup. Ct, G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
'In a supplementary opinion, Judge Irie stated:
The guarantee of due process of law in Article 31 of the Constitution does not
mean that so long as something is provided in the form of law it satisfies the
requirement of this provision. Even though it is stipulated by law, if the
content of the law is against the basic constitutional principles of modern
democratic states, the law violates Article 31. And this applies not only to
procedural law but also to substantive law, and not only to criminal cases but
also to other cases where state power infringes the rights and interests of
individuals.
Id. at 1582.
'367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961).
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The concept of due process may well play an even more important
role in Japan than it has in the United States in light of the historical
development of Japanese society.

III.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS

When the Japanese Constitution was drafted by the General Headquarters staff, the officers in charge were particularly conscious of the
American experience with the problems of constitutional interpretation. They knew how the United States Supreme Court had denied the
validity of laws required by changing social conditions, and how severely the Court had been criticized by scholars and law-makers sympathetic to such reform legislation for the conservative way it had
handled the due process clause. The American lawyers drafting the
Japanese Constitution gave serious consideration to this history and
inserted into Chapter III, affirming the "Rights and Duties of the
People," positive recognition of governmental power to control individual economic freedom in the interests of the public welfare. For
example, Article 27(2) provides that the "Standards for wages, hours,
rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law." Thus legislators are clearly free under the Constitution to regulate wages and
working hours on the basis of economic and social conditions despite
the encroachment of such laws upon the individual right of freedom
of contract and there can be no constitutional challenge on this ground
under either the Labor Standards Law33 or the Minimum Wage Law."
Nevertheless, the proper balance between human rights and governmental power must be sought at every stage of the historical development of society. Sometimes such human rights as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience need particularly
strong safeguards against governmental encroachment; at other times
material interests are similarly in need of protection.
The situation in Japan is such that stronger protection is needed
for both the former human rights and the expression of personal rights
through material interests. Professor Gellhorn's comment that the
Japanese Constitution does not give sufficient protection to property
rights has merit. 5 In addition because Japan's tradition of human
freedom is not as solid as that in the United States, strong guarantees
' 3 R3d5 kijunh5 (Labor standards law) (Law No. 49, 1947).
" Saitei chinginh, (Minimum wage law) (Law No. 137, 1959).
' W. GELLHORY, COMTAMENT ON THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (1959).
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of due process are needed, although there should be some exceptions
permitted because of the nature of administration. 6
A. Due Processin Land Ownership
One of the crucial questions at this time is that of land ownership.
When General MacArthur proposed a constitution to the Japanese
government, he included two articles which read as follows:
Article 28. The ultimate fee to the land and to all natural resources
reposes in the State as the collective representative of the people. Land
and other natural resources are subject to the right of the State to take
them, upon just compensation therefor, for the purpose of securing and
promoting the conservation, development, utilization and control thereof.
Article 29. Ownership of property imposes obligations. Its use shall
be in the public good. Private property may be taken by the State for
public use upon just compensation therefor.
These articles were not accepted by the Japanese government on
the ground that they were too close to nationalization of land and
natural resources. The Japanese government was not in favor of such
a sweeping negation of private ownership. Nevertheless by now the
Japanese Court should accept the basic conception of limitation of
ownership incorporated in this proposal.
This idea of limited ownership was in fact acknowledged in the land
7 There the former landlord
reform case, Tanaka v. Japan.1
whose
land was bought by the state to be given to the former tenant at a very
small price sued the government for just compensation, asserting that
the compensation provided violated the just compensation clause of
Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution.
Three different theories were suggested for sustaining the constitutionality of the land reform program. According to Professor Kawashima, the farm lands owned by large feudalistic landlords are not
appropriately included in the property guaranteed by Article 29 of the
Japanese Constitution. He reasons that all the modern constitutions
came into existence after the abolition of feudalistic land ownership
21M. IT6,

TEKIH6

TFrsuzuxi No HosH6 (Due process of law) 112 (1966). See

also M. Ono,'Keiji tetmizuki ni kansuru kempdjo no gensoku (Constitutional principles of criminal procedure), in 2 KEmP6 K6zA 238-59 (1963) ; K. Kawakami, Gyasei-

teki torislinarito kempo (Administrative control and the Constitution, in 2 KImP6,
S6G6 HANREI KENKrnY S6sHo (Comprehensive case study series, constitutional law)
135-83 (1962).
'7 Saik6 saibansho minji hanreishii 1523 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 27, 1953); English
translation in J. MAKI, supra note 25, at 228-52.
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and therefore their guarantees apply only to the property rights of a
modern capitalistic society. This theory is ingenious especially because it brings a historical perspective to bear on the interpretation
of the Constitution. However, as a principle of interpretation it is not
satisfactory because it lacks precision in distinguishing between feudalistic property and nonfeudalistic property. Even farm land ownership has become capitalistic and only those regulations stipulated in
the civil law can be applied to land ownership in modern Japanese
society.
The second theory assumes that the price paid in the land reform
program is not just compensation as stipulated in Article 29, and therefore the measure is clearly contrary to that provision of the Constitution; but that nevertheless the program was to be treated as valid
because land reform was laid down as an occupation policy. This
theory assumes that SCAP could simply ignore any constitutional
limitations in contravention of its policies. A similar reform could not
be repeated by the Japanese government itself under the present
Constitution but as far as the past program is concerned there would
be no problem. This theory too is quite ingenious but sounds like
justification for what was done by the occupation alone. It provides
no legal explanation for what was subsequently done by the Japanese
government under a valid constitution.
The third theory was adopted by the Japanese Supreme Court in
a decision of the Grand Bench, December 27, 1953, sustaining the
land reform program." The fair value of farm land was calculated as
the capitalization of actual income realized from the land. Since the
income was controlled by the governmental policy regulating the price
of rice and other produce, the capitalized sum was necessarily limited,
and this limited sum was held to be the appropriate price of the land.
Application of this theory to other possible acts of nationalization
might raise some interesting problems. Suppose for instance, the government was to restrict the dividend rate of a certain type of stock
and then capitalize this rate for the purpose of buying the stock and
nationalizing that particular industry. The only acceptable justification for lowering the price of the stock in this way would be another
principle embodied in the Constitution, i.e., the principle of social
welfare embodied in Article 25. But such discriminatory regulation directed at one particular type of stock would also raise a substantial
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question of equality under law, guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution.
B. Due Processin Land Use
Achieving a proper balance between free competition (private property) and social justice (the public welfare) should be regarded as the
basic ethos of the present Japanese Constitution. This idea is clearly
embodied in Articles 22 and 29 of the Constitution." The individual
right of freedom to engage in economic activities is guaranteed in these
articles subject to a clear limitation in the interest of the public welfare as defined by law.
Such coordination between individual freedom and social justice,
achieved through law, is one of the basic purposes of present-day
legislation especially in the field of economic activities. An outstanding example of this is land use control. One of the basic aspects of the
land problem is that land use cannot be increased except with the
social investment in transportation and other public utilities. This
means that the landowner profits by a rise in the price of land which
is caused not by his own work, but rather by social investment for
public purposes.
Another aspect of the problem is that land at a particular location
cannot be replaced by some other land; if the particular land is needed
for a public purpose and the landowner does not consent to sell, it
must be taken by the power of government. However, in order not to
be unfair to the particular owner he must be given just compensation.
Urbanization in the modern world requires stronger controls over land
and the extent to which private enterprise involving land is restricted
increases accordingly. There also arise new types of land use. For
instance, a new law, 0 enacted in 1966, provides for the establishment
of distribution centers outside concentrated and high traffic areas;
in order to create the new distribution business area, land can be expropriated according to the Land Expropriation Law.4 '
'Article 22 provides: "Every person shall have freedom to choose and change
his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere

with the public welfare."
For the provisions of Article 29, see text accompanying note 12 supra.
' 0 Ryatslgyonmu shigaichi no seibi ni kansura h~ritsu (Law concerning zones for
distribution businesses) (Law No. 110, 1966). (There is no precise English equivalent
for the term translated as "distribution business." It is a general term, including
within its scope both warehouses and passenger and freight transportation terminals.

-Ed.]

" Tochi sliiyaho (Law No. 219, 1951, as amnended, Laws No. 73, 74, 1967).
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We have to be careful in coordinating the interests of the public and
the private property owner. Land reform in Japan transferred large
land holdings from the feudalistic landowners to free working farmers
thus stimulating their interest in greater production. This land transfer
was one of the reasons for the rapid economic development in post-war
Japan. However, land values in urbanized areas can be increased not
so much by the work of the landowner as by public investment in
utilities. Urban land use can therefore properly be restricted much
more severely than farm land use.
However, if the restriction affects only a particular group of people,
they should be justly compensated for their loss. Let us consider, for
instance, the new City Planning Law.4 2 According to this law the city
planning area is to be divided into urbanized and controlled urbanization areas. The City Plan will include establishments such as roads,
railroads, terminals, parks, waterways, schools, houses, and distribution business4" areas. Development activity is not to be permitted
in the controlled urbanization area, unless the plan fits the conditions
set forth in the law.
This kind of restriction may cause quite a difference in the price of
the land in each of these two areas. The control of real property for
the sake of the public welfare is necessary, but if it causes inequality
among landowners, those who suffer economically should be justly
compensated.4 4
"'The City Planning Law (Law No. 100, 1968) revised the outdated City Planning
Law of 1919.
" There is no precise English equivalent for the Japanese term translated as
"distribution business." See note 40 supra.
" Comparable American cases recognizing the principle that land restrictions
may conceivably bear so heavily on particular landowners that compensation is
required either under the just compensation clause or the due process clause are
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (dicta); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co. 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (dicta); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
The above is more the exception than the rule, however. Since Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the right of states, under their police power, to enact reasonable restrictions upon
a landowner's use of his property. The limit on the exercise of such land use regulations is that they cannot so restrict the use of land as to render it valueless. See
8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.45 at 117 (3d ed. rev. 1965). However, it is well established that the due process clauses of the American constitution do
not guarantee to the landowner the most profitable use of his land, even if the
restriction thus imposed deprives the landowner of a substantial potential profit. A
number of cases go quite far in upholding such restrictions. See, e.g., Carlson v.
Bellevue, 73 Wash. Dec. 2(1 40, 435 P.2d 957 (1968) ; Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md.
611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965).
In recent American thought, it has been suggested that zoning is not always the
most appropriate method of regulation, and that in some cases condemnation of
development rights in the land would be more just. See generally, Eveleth, An Ap-
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The same is true in the case of a bill which, if enacted, would
establish a basic plan for land utilization whereby each land utilization
area is to be divided into various sections with an appropriate land use
for each section designated. There is no stipulation regarding compensation even though a tract of land is designated as a "green section,) 45 except that the landowner may ask for the purchase of it by
the government.
It is not easy to give fair treatment to everyone in such complex
situations but the aim of the law is to provide equal treatment, without
any discrimination. Equality is also guaranteed in Article 14 of the
Constitution where it is stipulated that "[a]ll of the people are equal
under the law." Consequently, if a law does create inequality or discrimination without justification, it should be judged unconstitutional
as contravening Articles 14 and 31. Article 31 should serve as the
basic bulwark against any kind of discriminatory, unreasonable and
unfair encroachment upon the fundamental human rights guaranteed
under Japan's democratic form of government.

praisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Spaces, 9 ViLL. L. REv. 559 (1964) ; Note,
Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning, 12
STAN. L. REv. 638 (1960).
'The term "Green section" (Ryoku chli) is used in various laws, such as Toshi
keikakuhd (City planning law) arts. 8, 1, 11, 11(2) (Law No. 100, 1968), and Toshi
k6enh5 (City park law) art. 2 (Law No. 79, 1956). It is an area very much like a
park, but it also means the "Green Belt" area where, in order to preserve trees in the
city, construction of buildings is controlled by government.

